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188 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
to assume that judicial review is available to rectify the alleged dep-
rivation begs the question because that is the very point at issue.
If chapter III is viewed merely as a prediction that the Supreme
Court will hold judgments of impeachment reviewable, it may be cor-
rect. But to the extent it purports to base that prediction on a rea-
soned extrapolation from authoritative sources, it is dubious. And to
the extent it attempts to justify judicial review, it is -totally unconvin-
cing. Too much contrary authority is ignored, and too many hard ques-
tions are bypassed to make it cogent.
CONCLUSION
I probably have made Berger appear more dogmatic than he is.
For -the most part, Berger is tentative and self-effacing: "The con-
clusion that 'high crimes and misdemeanors' was adopted as a 'tech-
nical' limiting phrase leaves perplexing problems; and it is to be hoped
that my reflections will stimulate further study and investigation."0 3
Certainly the result of his labor is a timely, interesting, and valuable
contribution to a previously ignored subject. Perhaps no higher praise
can be given than to observe that all future debate about impeachment
will use Berger's book as a starting point.
JULES B. GERARD'
THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS. By Boris I. Bittker.1 New York:
Vintage Books, 1973. Pp. 191. $1.95 (paper).
One leaves the reading of this short, scholarly work with revived
hunger for a society capable of acting upon Boris Bittker's generous
legal and moral perceptions of why and how we should provide con-
temporary black American citizens with reparations for the evils they
have suffered at the hands of the white majority. But one senses that
this hunger will go unrequited, much like, in Lincoln's phrase, "the
63. IMPlEACHMENT 93.
* Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University.
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bcndsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil."2  Bittker
disavows any purpose beyond opening the legal discussion of the rep-
arations issue, but he is plainly committed to the notion that repara-
tions in some form are proper. Is that notion widely shared, politically
or morally? I doubt it. We are looking at an idea whose time is, at
best, yet to come, an idea profoundly antithetical to the inarticulate
instinct of too many Americans who elect too many legislators and
whose views influence the approaches of too many of the judges whose
courtrooms might provide an alternative way to redress for black griev-
ances. I should like to be wrong in this, soon, but I -take my view
of the possible from Carl Sandburg:
If you can imagine love letters written back and forth between Mary
Magdalene and Judas Iscariot, if you can see Napoleon dying and saying
he was only a sawdust emperor and an imitation of the real thing, if
you can see judges step down from the bench and take death sentences
from murderers in black robes, if you can see big thieves protected by
law acknowledging to petty thieves handcuffed and convicted that they
are both enemies of society, if you can vision an opposite for every
reality, then you can shake hands with yourself and murmur, "Pardon
my glove, what were we saying when interrupted?"3
And yet, my gloom to one side, what Bittker essays in The Case
for Black Reparations is not short of wonderful, an exceptional lesson
in the capacity of a humane legal scholar to come to grips dispas-
sionately, rationally, and persuasively with a subject vulnerable to de-
structively emotional treatment in the hands of others, whether of the
left or the right. Should a day arrive which witnesses a Presidency
resurrected, a Congress reinvested, and a creative public confidence
restored, what Bittker has had to say today, in tumultuous and dis-
cordant times, will greatly contribute to the intellectual framework
within which we may proceed toward a sensible revision of racial
wrongdoing.
Bittker's fundamental contribution in this regard is to shift the focus
of reparations discussions from the idea of paying for the slave labor
that terminated one hundred years ago to the less traumatic notion
of compensation for the wrongs committed in the name of white su-
premacy since emancipation. It has been estimated that the value
2. Second Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln, Mar. 4, 1865, reprinted in
THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS 253, 256 (R. Bowers ed. 1929).
3. C. SANDBURG, THm PEOPLE, YES 68 (1936).
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of unpaid black equity in slave labor totals somewhere between $448
billion and $995 billion;4 at the sound of these numbers practical men
wince, and this is of course to leave aside the theoretical difficulties
in visiting the costs of Greek Helots on present day Athenians, or the
damages due nineteenth century Massachusetts lint-lung victims, -the
child millworkers, on the current administrations in Springfield, Bos-
ton, or Washington, D.C. Shifting analysis away from the bedeviling
thought of compensation today for wrongs of ancient vintage is thus
an important first step in developing a rational approach capable of
gathering wider popular support than could otherwise be generated.
Bittker correctly observes that the various black initiatives regarding
reparations, notably the Black Manifesto (1969) adopted- by the Na-
tional Black Economic Development Conference and Dr. Martin Lu-
ther King's Bill of Rights for the Disadvantaged (1964), have been
widely misread as calling for compensation for slavery, and thus have
not received the kind of -thoughtful review they deserve. To the con-
trary, says Bittker, the essential first point to be made about proposals
for black reparations "is that .they seek to redress injuries caused by
a system of legally imposed segregation that was eventually held in
Brown v. Boatrd of Education to violate the equal-protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."5  That perception significantly clears
the air, for we 'are now no longer talking about old injuries whose
consequences would be difficult to trace down the years to contem-
porary beneficiaries; instead we are looking at the living young adult
denied an -adequate education in a pre-Brown segregated school, the
consumer of systematically deficient municipal services such ,as sanita-
tion -and the paving and lighting of streets, the black housewife humili-
ated by banishment to the back of the bus, and all the other examples
of persons who within recent memory have been harmed in one way
or another -by the persuasive grip of officially sanctioned or tolerated
separation of -the races.
This revolution in perspective achieved, Bittker turns to method.
Here, whether the legislature or the judiciary is to serve as the vehicle
for reparations, the problems are legion. It is clear to me that Bittker
favors a legislative program although he devotes a great deal of analy-
sis to what he terms the "alternative scenario," redress through suits
4. J. MARKETTI, BLACK EQUITY IN THE SLAVE INDusTRY 15 (1969).
5. B. BnTrER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATONS 19 (1973).
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 6 His analysis of section 1983 is superb: all
the critical questions are asked, if not always resolved. Are there pre-
cedents elsewhere in the law for the award of damages to victims of
practices analogous to the harmful details of segregation? Is it con-
ceivable that section 1983 liability was intended to attach to state of-
ficials who enforced segregation when segregation was the legal way
of life? If political subdivisions, for whom these officials acted, are
not liable under Monroe v. Paper is the state itself liable? In the
post-Brown era, what kinds of official footdragging will be understood
as occasioning liability? Assuming liability for either pre- or post-
Brown actions, what is the measure of damages? Professor Bittker's
analysis of options in this latter regard is particularly illuminating.
Yet, when all the questions are asked, and all the scholarship sub-
mitted, one is left with the sense that the true answer to a problem
of the magnitude of reparations is not finally for the courts. To ful-
fill the dream of social justice which Professor Bittker plainly harbors,
one will have to find a solution other than several million -lawsuits. He
does not assert this outright, but the effectiveness of his own legal
arguments regarding the problems to be faced in a reparations effort
in the judicial forum leaves this conclusion all but unavoidable.
What, then, of a legislative effort? Bittker clearly thinks that, con:
stitutional considerations aside for the moment, Congress is free to
make amends for wrongs done under a system of law that authorized
those wrongs at the time they were committed. The example cited
is that of the creation by Congress" of the Indian Claims Commission
in 1946 "to redress some of the wrongs committed while America was
pursuing her manifest destiny by pushing back the Indians . . .-
Bittker also recommends the potential usefulness of one of the
Claims Commission's standards for relief, "claims based upon fair and
honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law
or equity,"10 should Congress decide to move on the black reparations
issue. But he finds chilling problems arising after these easy prelimi-
naries. Should a program of reparations be individual or group
oriented? If individuals are to be granted compensation directly, will
6. Id. at 30-35.
7. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
8. Ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946), as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-2 (1970,
Supp. II, 1972).
9. B. BinrKR, supra note 5, at 22.
10. 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1970), quoted in id.
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this require the development of a racial code, that is, a classification
system whereby one measure of "blackness" is established, with all
the ominous implications of sharper polarization of the races that
would conceivably follow? If the reparations program is to distribute
wealth through groups, what kind of wealth, which groups, and with
what objectives? How will grants to some groups be legitimized when
others purporting to represent differing constituencies get nothing?
The questions proliferate, and the author carefully delineates the dif-
ficulties inherent in each response. Here Bittker's interrogative in-
tent, as distinct from a wish to reach definite conclusions, emerges
most incisively. The reader must reflect; here nothing is pre-digested.
In a concluding chapter, the author assesses the constitutionality of
a federal program of reparations devoted exclusively to the benefit of
black citizens. When a program's objective is redressive rather than
repressive, or benign rather than malignant, does its use of race as
the qualifying factor collide with the first Justice Harlan's "color
blind"" Constitution? Bittker, guardedly, thinks not. Examining the
Supreme Court's tolerance of the use of racial percentages in the
Swann case 2 as a "starting point in shaping a remedy to come of past
constitutional violations,"'1 3 the Court's further recognition that school
boards cannot be denied discretionary use of racial percentages in dis-
mantling dual school systems,' 4 the host of yet-to-be-rejected programs
to end discrimination in employment, union membership, and college
admissions, and finally the Court's treatment in Katzenbach v.
Morgan'5 of congressional power to intrude, in a fashion favorable to
Puerto Ricans, into the domain of state power to fix voter literacy re-
quirements, Bittker finds adequate basis for sustaining a remedial pro-
gram which uses race as a classification. As I write, the resolution
of this momentous question, at least at the state level,', may be ap-
proaching as the Court deliberates DeFunis v. Odegaard,17 in which
11. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554 (1896).
12. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
13. Id. at 12, quoted in B. BirrnR, supra note 5, at 118.
14. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swarm, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971).
15, -384-U.S. 6.41 .(1966).
16. A decision against the state in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d
1169, cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 538 (1973), would not necessarily mean that Congress
could not act on a reparations program under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
17. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 538 (1973). It is
conceivable that DeFunis will be dismissed as moot once DeFunis graduates in Juno
1974.
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the preferential admission of blacks to the University of Washington
Law School is at issue. I hope the Court finds room in the Constitu-
tion for the classification the University of Washington has used. If
it does not, one will take solace in remembering that the Constitution
grows and accommodates, guided by the learning and vision of
scholars like Professor Bittker, whose splendid effort here will survive
for a different era.
JOHN G. MURPHY, JR.*
FROM CONFEDERATION TO NATION: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION,
1835-1877. By Bernard Schwartz. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1973. Pp. xi, 243. $10.00.
From Confederation to Nation is a constitutional history of the
United States in the nineteenth century. To be more exact, it is an
examination of the operation of the Federal Constitution from 1835
(the year of John Marshall's death) to 1877 (the end of Reconstruc-
tion). Although the book is rather short (only 243 pages, including
index), it is packed with information and analysis. None of the im-
portant American constitutional developments of the period is ex-
cluded from discussion. The thesis of the book is that between 1835
and 1877 the United States was transformed from a loose confedera-
tion with a weak central government into a nation whose central gov-
ernment possessed both the military strength to restrain rebellious
states from leaving the Union and the political authority to protect in-
dividual rights from abridgment under color of state authority. In
overview, the book is a successful effort .to support -this thesis by tra-
cing constitutional developments between 1835 and 1877. According
to Professor Schwartz, these developments were so significant, and the
transformation of government so momentous, that "[t]he four decades
after Marshall's death can be considered as a virtual continuing con-
stitutional convention. .... I
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. B. SCHWARTZ, FROM CONFEDERATION TO NATION: THE AMERIcAN CONsTrU-
TION, 1835-1877, at x (1973) [hereinafter cited as ScHwARTzI.
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